An attack on signaling. Irreversible physical consequences.
A SYSTEMICALLY CONNECTED AND UNDERAUDITED CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
OUR SERVICES
QREDTEAM
ADVERSARY SIMULATION
- Railway OT Red Team — attack simulation on signaling and control
- Testing of IT→OT lateral-movement paths from the corporate network to the controllers
- Supply-chain compromise simulation via a provider (DSB/Supeo type)
- Red Team of ATM, ATC and airport infrastructure systems
- Pentest of ticketing, passenger and operational-management systems.
QLAB
DEEP SECURITY RESEARCH
- Reverse engineering of ETCS/ERTMS and CBTC system firmware without sources
- Analysis of railway protocols (MVB, CAN, Profibus, IEC 61375) and debug interfaces
- 0-day research on transport OT equipment (Alstom, Siemens Mobility, Thales Rail)
- Supply-chain audit of critical software providers — dependencies and backdoors
- Firmware audit of train embedded systems and avionics (ACARS, ADS-B).
QSHIELD
SOFTWARE PROTECTION
- Protection of railway embedded-system firmware against reverse engineering
- Anti-cloning for suppliers exporting signaling systems outside the EU
- IP protection of train-control and automation algorithms
- Protection of infrastructure-management software against adversary analysis
- Anti-cloning for ATM systems exported to geopolitically risky markets.
DIFFERENTIATOR QUARKSLAB
NIS2 compliance audits verify security policies — not the protocols that move trains, manage runways or drive logistics flows. Quarkslab works in depth across all three sub-sectors: firmware of railway signaling equipment (ETCS, CBTC), avionics and ATM embedded systems exposed via their provider chains, and warehouse-management and logistics-traceability systems interconnected with OT networks. In every case, the same conviction: the real attack surface isn’t in your ISMS’s documented policies — it’s in the systems no one has ever tested offensively.
WHAT WOULD WE SAY TO EACH OTHER, FACE TO FACE
Is your shared software provider your main vulnerability?
Three sectors, one pattern: the attack never comes from where you expect it. DSB Denmark: compromising the subcontractor Supeo was enough to stop every train in the country. Collins MUSE: one airport check-in software paralyzed Heathrow, Brussels and Berlin simultaneously. XPO Logistics 2023: ransomware on the TMS halted distribution flows for dozens of clients. In all three cases, the vector is not the critical infrastructure itself — it’s the shared software provider, the pooled management system, the unaudited third-party access. That is precisely where Quarkslab steps in.