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Aerospace & Aeronautics - Quarkslab

Aerospace & Aeronautics

Manufacturers, suppliers, operators

The firmware that flies can’t have flaws.

ADS-B with no authentication, FADEC on 20-year-old architectures, military satellites targeted by 7 documented APT groups. Avionics security is not a regulatory option — Quarkslab audits it where no one else goes.

1
APT groups actively targeting the sector
DO- 326 A
EASA avionics cybersecurity standard, mandatory
$ 1 K/hr
Cost of halting an Airbus assembly line
1 years
Average lifespan of a certified avionics system

AN ATTACK SURFACE FROM THE COCKPIT TO ORBIT

FADEC, FMS, ACARS: 20-year-old code, open interfaces
Avionics systems run on RTOS (VxWorks, LynxOS, Green Hills) never patched since their certification. JTAG/UART maintenance interfaces remain active in production. ARINC 429/664 buses transmit flight data with no cryptographic authentication.
ADS-B & GPS: protocols with no native authentication
ADS-B broadcasts aircraft positions without any authentication — spoofing costs €200 of hardware. In 2024-2025, incidents were documented over the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea. ACARS can be injected to falsify ATC instructions.
APT40, Volt Typhoon: F-35, FCAS, military satellites
APT40 (MSS) is documented on the F-35 and FCAS programs. Volt Typhoon is pre-positioning on US ATM infrastructure. APT29 has exfiltrated data from NATO aviation programs via compromised software supply chains.
DO-326A: cyber certification is not a checklist
DO-326A requires a documented Security Risk Assessment (SeRA) on avionics systems — not a network scan dressed up as a report. EASA/FAA certification dossiers must include structured security assessments performed by qualified providers.

OUR SERVICES

QREDTEAM

ADVERSARY SIMULATION

  • APT Red Team (APT40, Volt Typhoon) on OEM and MRO networks
  • Pentest of embedded avionics interfaces (EFB, maintenance ports, ACARS)
  • GPS/ADS-B spoofing simulation and CPDLC command injection
  • Supply-chain Red Team via aeronautics PLM/CAD/ERP portals.

QLAB

DEEP SECURITY RESEARCH

  • Avionics firmware reverse engineering (VxWorks, LynxOS, Green Hills) without sources
  • SATCOM terminal audit — firmware extraction, proprietary protocols
  • 0-day research on ARINC 429/664 buses and proprietary avionics protocols
  • Structured DO-326A / PART-IS deliverables, integrable into EASA/FAA dossiers.

QSHIELD

SOFTWARE PROTECTION

  • Protection of military-drone autopilot firmware against adversary reverse engineering
  • Anti-RE of the embedded code of exported military and commercial satellites
  • IP protection of navigation and guidance algorithms delivered abroad
  • Anti-tamper compatible with DO-326A certification.

QUARKSLAB DIFFERENTIATOR

Quarkslab is the only independent player in Europe combining reverse engineering of certified avionics RTOS, native DO-326A/PART-IS deliverables, and QShield to protect the firmware of drones and satellites delivered abroad. A combination that exists nowhere else.

WHAT WOULD WE SAY TO EACH OTHER, FACE TO FACE

Can your security provider read a VxWorks binary on ARM without source access?

DO-326A is not a form to fill in. It is an assessment that requires genuinely understanding what runs in your systems. A network scan doesn’t see the vulnerabilities in the FADEC. The certification you spent years obtaining doesn’t guarantee that the code is free of flaws exploitable today.